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Perspectives of Australian policy-makers on the potential benefits and risks
of technologically enhanced communicable disease surveillance - a
modified Delphi survey
Abstract
Background: Event-based social media monitoring and pathogen whole genome sequencing (WGS) will
enhance communicable disease surveillance research and systems. If linked electronically and scanned
systematically, the information provided by these technologies could be mined to uncover new
epidemiological patterns and associations much faster than traditional public health approaches. The benefits
of earlier outbreak detection are significant, but implementation could be opposed in the absence of a social
licence or if ethical and legal concerns are not addressed. Methods: A three-phase mixed-method Delphi
survey with Australian policy-makers, health practitioners and lawyers (n = 44) was conducted to explore
areas of consensus and disagreement over (1) key policy and practical issues raised by the introduction of
novel communicable disease surveillance programmes; and (2) the most significant and likely risks from
using social media content and WGS technologies in epidemiological research and outbreak investigations.
Results: Panellists agreed that the integration of social media monitoring and WGS technologies into
communicable disease surveillance systems raised significant issues, including impacts on personal privacy,
medicolegal risks and the potential for unintended consequences. Notably, their concerns focused on how
these technologies should be used, rather than how the data was collected. Panellists held that social media
users should expect their posts to be monitored in the interests of public health, but using those platforms to
contact identified individuals was controversial. The conditions of appropriate use of pathogen WGS in
epidemiological research and investigations was also contentious. Key differences amongst participants
included the necessity for consent before testing and data-linkage, thresholds for action, and the legal and
ethical importance of harms to individuals and commercial entities. The erosion of public trust was seen as the
most significant risk from the systematic use of these technologies. Conclusions: Enhancing communicable
disease surveillance with social-media monitoring and pathogen WGS may cause controversy. The challenge
is to determine and then codify how these technologies should be used such that the balance between
individual risk and community benefit is widely accepted. Participants agreed that clear guidelines for
appropriate use that address legal and ethical concerns need to be developed in consultation with relevant
experts and the broader Australian public.
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Abstract
Background: Event-based social media monitoring and pathogen whole genome sequencing (WGS) will enhance
communicable disease surveillance research and systems. If linked electronically and scanned systematically, the
information provided by these technologies could be mined to uncover new epidemiological patterns and
associations much faster than traditional public health approaches. The benefits of earlier outbreak detection are
significant, but implementation could be opposed in the absence of a social licence or if ethical and legal concerns
are not addressed.
Methods: A three-phase mixed-method Delphi survey with Australian policy-makers, health practitioners and
lawyers (n = 44) was conducted to explore areas of consensus and disagreement over (1) key policy and practical
issues raised by the introduction of novel communicable disease surveillance programmes; and (2) the most
significant and likely risks from using social media content and WGS technologies in epidemiological research and
outbreak investigations.
Results: Panellists agreed that the integration of social media monitoring and WGS technologies into
communicable disease surveillance systems raised significant issues, including impacts on personal privacy,
medicolegal risks and the potential for unintended consequences. Notably, their concerns focused on how these
technologies should be used, rather than how the data was collected. Panellists held that social media users should
expect their posts to be monitored in the interests of public health, but using those platforms to contact identified
individuals was controversial. The conditions of appropriate use of pathogen WGS in epidemiological research and
investigations was also contentious. Key differences amongst participants included the necessity for consent before
testing and data-linkage, thresholds for action, and the legal and ethical importance of harms to individuals and
commercial entities. The erosion of public trust was seen as the most significant risk from the systematic use of
these technologies.
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Conclusions: Enhancing communicable disease surveillance with social-media monitoring and pathogen WGS may
cause controversy. The challenge is to determine and then codify how these technologies should be used such
that the balance between individual risk and community benefit is widely accepted. Participants agreed that clear
guidelines for appropriate use that address legal and ethical concerns need to be developed in consultation with
relevant experts and the broader Australian public.
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Introduction
Significant outbreaks of infectious disease have impacts
that extend beyond morbidity and mortality. Since they
are often unanticipated and unpredictable, such out-
breaks can cause fear, economic instability and social up-
heaval [1, 2]. Establishing and maintaining surveillance
systems are the foundation of effective outbreak detec-
tion and public health response. Moreover, effective rou-
tine surveillance is central to the rational allocation of
resources and addressing health inequalities, which can-
not be tackled unless made visible. Because surveillance
relies on the collection, collation and interpretation of
large amounts of data, technological innovation has the
potential to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of
population-based communicable disease research and
surveillance systems. For example, the increasing avail-
ability of pathogen whole genome sequencing (WGS)
and the collection of passive data generated by internet
and mobile phone use within a population, will provide
new resources for communicable disease research and
surveillance activities [3–5].
Methods for characterisation of microbes have become
increasingly sophisticated over the last 20 years. WGS
technologies can provide rapid and accurate information
about which microbial species and strain type is causing
an outbreak and the timing and direction of transmis-
sion. Incorporating this information into surveillance
systems will permit more accurate biological risk predic-
tion and faster outbreak identification and tracking [6,
7], but also reveal information about individuals that
many people would consider to be private [8]. Concur-
rent with these developments in microbiological analysis,
there has been a similar rate of technological innovation
in data management. Using the tools provided by ‘Big
Data’, syndromic surveillance systems can track and inte-
grate online data collected for unrelated purposes that
potentially reflect disease activity in the community such
as social media posts and internet searches [9–13]. Inte-
grating either or both of these new sources of informa-
tion into communicable surveillance practices has the
potential to greatly enhance current systems. If linked
electronically and scanned systematically, pathogen
WGS data and user-generated online information could
be mined to uncover new epidemiological patterns and
associations much faster than traditional public health
approaches [14–16]. Incorporating these new technolo-
gies and novel sources of information into established
communicable disease surveillance systems should im-
prove our understanding of the rate and direction of dis-
ease transmission between individuals and within
populations, provide earlier warning and more accurate
monitoring of outbreaks, and reduce uncertainty and
public fear during their early stages [8, 17].
The benefits of earlier outbreak detection and re-
sponse are significant but, when there is no immediate
threat, the routine use of a new technology to capture
more detailed, specific personal health information could
be perceived as intrusive and a threat to privacy, no mat-
ter how great the potential benefits for research and
practice. When implementing such systems, sovereign
states, health authorities and surveillance officers must
consider the organisational, political, legislative, personal
and ethical implications of surveillance [18–20]. How-
ever, there are also ethical and medico-legal risks in not
using available information that could protect local and,
potentially, international communities from serious dis-
ease outbreaks [21, 22]. Health authorities and re-
searchers in Australia, and elsewhere, are beginning to
explore the use of pathogen WGS and event-based
social media monitoring, but many jurisdictions still
lack policies and structures to support these technolo-
gies [5, 23, 24].
In this paper, we report the results of a modified Del-
phi survey involving policy-makers and experts with
backgrounds relevant to the legal, ethical and epidemio-
logical dimensions of technology-enhanced surveillance
systems. This method is particularly useful for techno-
logical forecasting and the evaluation of complex prob-
lems where (1) the rate of socio-technical change
exceeds that which can be managed by technocratic
styles of governance; and/or (2) objective data (and
models and relations dependent on this data) are insuffi-
cient to explain or predict social actions [25]. Partici-
pants were drawn from two broad groups, namely (1) an
established policy community centred on communicable
disease control and (2) an emerging issues network of
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individuals interested in the social, legal and security di-
mensions of technological change and innovation.
Policy communities and issues networks are at either
end of a continuum characterised by differing levels of
internal cohesiveness, state support and access to, and
ability to regulate, shared resources [26]. Policy commu-
nities are stable, institutionally entrenched groups who
share values and broad policy preferences, interact fre-
quently and participate in relatively equal communica-
tions to produce lasting policy outcomes; conversely,
issue networks include increasingly influential academic,
industry and interest groups varying in levels of
co-ordination and access to resources, who discuss, cri-
tique and generate ideas for policy initiatives in specific
policy areas [27, 28]. This study is part of a larger project
to develop guidance for policy-makers; its aim is to en-
gage these two networks in a conversation about the so-
cial, ethical and legal implications of the use of new
technologies (online data monitoring and WGS patho-
gen fingerprinting) in infectious disease research, control
and prevention. In this Delphi survey we sought to (1)
identify perceived barriers to the adoption and effective
implementation of new technology for communicable
disease research and surveillance; and (2) explore areas
of consensus or disagreement about potential threats or
conflicts of interest between individuals, commercial en-
tities and the broader community associated with it.
Methods
Participants
A heterogeneous and geographically dispersed group of
Australian-based policy-makers and experts in infectious
diseases, epidemiology, food safety, health informatics
systems, and health and technology law were invited to
participate in this Delphi survey. Noting that the bound-
ary between the roles of policy-makers and expert advi-
sors can be nebulous, we defined ‘policy-makers’ as
individuals who participate in policy processes to create,
order and maintain rules and structures of action, and
‘experts’ as individuals with knowledge and experience
of the law and/or public health practices, relevant to in-
fectious disease control and prevention, technological
innovation, or both [29, 30]. Sampling was purposive, to
ensure representation of the relevant disciplines and
types of actors. Potential participants were identified
through institutional websites and researchers’ profes-
sional networks.
Delphi processes
The rationale underpinning Delphi surveys is that con-
sensus about contentious issues carries more weight
than individual opinions [31]. Anonymous data are col-
lected from individuals, collated and then re-presented
to the group to elicit further responses [32]. In this
study, we analysed data iteratively in parallel with data
collection. Rather than force consensus, we employed a
modified technique that allowed participants to explain
their views. Participants were asked to assess and re-
spond to the levels of consensus/disagreement that
emerged from each round to provide greater insight into
the potential benefits, harms and risks of using new
technologies to enhance communicable disease surveil-
lance. Participants who completed each round were in-
vited to participate in the next, but were free to
withdraw at any time. We used an online survey plat-
form (Limesurvey).
In round 1, we asked participants to respond to three
hypothetical scenarios (available in Additional file 1) de-
scribing the use of a new technology for the purposes of
communicable disease surveillance in (1) social media/
online, (2) hospital/workplace, or (3) commercial envi-
ronments. Responses were analysed qualitatively and
coded thematically by two authors (CD and JJ) using
framework analysis, a deductive matrix-based qualitative
research method for ordering and synthesising textual
data, developed by the National Centre for Social Re-
search (United Kingdom). Framework analysis methods
are especially well suited to conducting applied and
policy-relevant research [33, 34]. During rounds 2 and 3,
participants’ comments, key arguments and levels of
consensus from previous rounds were presented as quo-
tations, bar charts and summaries of qualitative findings,
taking care to weigh different opinions and arguments
equally. Individual comments were de-identified.
Additional data and comments were collected, using
Likert scales and free text responses. On completion of
each round, participants’ Likert scores were tabulated
and free text answers analysed qualitatively, as described.
The final stage of analysis during preparation of this re-
port drew on the knowledge and professional experience
of the research team, which includes expertise in health
social science, bioethics, Australian health law, infectious
diseases, microbiological laboratory and data sciences,
and health protection. This study was approved by the




Email invitations were sent to 92 potential participants,
of whom 44 (47%) from a range of relevant roles and
disciplines responded (Additional file 2: Table S1). Invi-
tations included an individualised link to the online sur-
vey, through which participant consent was obtained. As
expected, the panel size gradually decreased as partici-
pants withdrew [35], but the balance between sectors
and characteristics of participants remained substantially
constant (Additional file 2: Table S1).
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Enhanced communicable disease surveillance in digital
environments
In round 1, panellists answered a series of structured
questions about a scenario describing the use of a new
online event-based surveillance system that monitors so-
cial media (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) for indicators of
emerging public health risks. In the scenario, the new
system picks up a post on Facebook from Bob, a
25-year-old high school teacher from Sydney. His post
suggests that he may have contracted highly pathogenic
avian influenza on a recent holiday to Indonesia. Online
discussion of symptoms and work absences also suggests
that Bob might have spread the infection to several of
his colleagues. Delphi participants proposed a number of
responses to this scenario. While the mandate to re-
spond to a potential public health risk was seen to be
clear, Delphi panellists disagreed about how to do this
and how to contact those most at risk (particularly Bob
and his colleagues). After reading each other’s comments
and suggestions on the merits and risks of different
strategies for addressing this acute situation, in rounds 2
and 3 we asked the panel to nominate which approach
to contacting Bob they thought was the most
appropriate.
Figure 1 shows that, while a direct approach (speaking
to Bob in person) was strongly favoured, a majority of
panel members questioned the acceptability of using a
social media platform for this communication, even
though Bob had posted information about his health sta-
tus in a public forum. Others were concerned that an
online intervention could create panic by identifying
Bob as a public health risk. As one panellist noted:
DP #12: “Where individuals have already disclosed
information themselves, then one can make a
reasonable assertion that the information is therefore
not private. This, however, is not the same as that
individual allowing or being willing to have their
social media platform used to contact or warn others
or to make further enquiries, since all of these actions
have the potential to alarm, stigmatise or otherwise
negatively affect the social media user.”
When asked to answer either yes or no, 83% of
round 2 Delphi panellists agreed that members of the
public should expect that their activities on social
media could be used for public health surveillance.
Using a list drawn from responses to previous rounds,
panellists were asked, in round 3, to indicate the con-
ditions under which they believed surveillance of so-
cial media is appropriate (Fig. 2). The key differences
(revealed in the comments) were the extent to which
participants were concerned about the lack of a clear
legal and social mandate and the potential for negative
Fig. 1 Panellist’s preferences as to how public health authorities should contact someone flagged by an online event-based communicable
disease surveillance system
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public reactions. Many panellists also expressed
doubts about the veracity and validity of data passively
collected from online sources:
DP #37: “…we don’t know how reliable social media
actually is in these circumstances. People post things
on social media for lots of reasons. It may not be
accurate and could be misleading. So use of the data
may lead to a wasteful, inappropriate and/or
damaging response.”
Taken together, these results indicate that most ex-
perts agree that using social media as a source of data
for routine population health surveillance does not
raise significant ethical concerns. However, there is
considerable uncertainty about the legitimacy and ac-
ceptability of moving beyond population surveillance
to use these online systems as a platform for targeted
interventions during a public health response, espe-
cially when the individuals involved might be publicly
identifiable. The sectoral affiliation of panel partici-
pants did not appear to influence responses, except in
the case of those with legal backgrounds, who strongly
preferred that any of the activities discussed should
take place under the auspices of a dedicated legislative
framework.
Enhanced communicable disease surveillance in hospital/
workplace environments
The second scenario described the use of a novel, highly
discriminatory WGS strain-typing system that can rou-
tinely type all methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
isolates from hospital patients. Because WGS technology
can provide a pathogen’s unique genetic ‘fingerprint’, it
can potentially identify the timing and direction of indi-
vidual person-to-person transmission events. In the sce-
nario, the new technology shows that two premature
babies who were cared for and died in the same neonatal
intensive care unit both had the same rare
community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococ-
cus aureus strain.
Panellists agreed that the most important measures to be
taken in response to this scenario were a thorough cleaning
of the neonatal intensive care unit facility and a renewed
focus on infection control. There was, however, disagree-
ment as to how WGS and strain-typing technologies
should be used to mitigate the risks of further infections
(other infants, parents, staff, etc.). Most prominent were
Fig. 2 Panellist’s preferences for the appropriate use of social media for event-based enhanced epidemiological surveillance (Round 3)
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varying levels of concern about (1) the lack of consent from
the parents to use WGS on the isolates collected from the
dead neonates for the purposes of conducting an epidemio-
logical investigation; (2) the confidentiality of information
elicited through testing and strain typing isolates taken
from other patients, parents and/or staff members; and (3)
the impact on a staff member or parent if they were found
to be the source of the pathogen.
Nevertheless, panellists saw an overriding need to ad-
dress the outbreak in the interests of public safety, irre-
spective of any broader questions about consent,
confidentiality and discrimination. As one panellist noted:
DP #07 “…the main issue, is not whether strain typing
is done, but how the results are handled. It is in
everyone’s interest to understand how pathogens are
transmitted so that transmission can be prevented in
future, but there should never be any blame (or,
hopefully guilt) or penalties involved.”
To explore this issue further, panellists were asked,
in round 3, to indicate under what conditions they
believed it is appropriate to waive consent from indi-
viduals (patients, families and/or staff ) and perform a
test for an epidemiological investigation aimed at ad-
dressing a potential risk to the health of future pa-
tients. Figure 3 shows that most panellists held that
the protection of the public was of overriding import-
ance and that most of the potential harms could be
managed by establishing systems to maintain the
confidentiality of those effected. However, differences
in the priority afforded by panellists to different con-
ditions of use, such as absence of alternatives, rights
of appeal, and likely effectiveness, indicate that the
appropriate thresholds for taking such actions
remained contentious. Once again, neither the policy
network from which participants were recruited, nor
their sectorial background appears to have been a
major influence on panellists’ opinions and
perspectives.
Fig. 3 Panellist’s preferences as to the conditions under which the possession of isolates collected from individuals should carry with it the
authority to conduct a test that was not agreed to at the time of collection (Round 3)
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Enhanced communicable disease surveillance in
commercial environments
The final scenario described a significant and fatal out-
break of infection due to a rare strain of Listeria (15
cases/5 deaths) in the community, which appears to be
linked to the consumption of chicken-wraps produced
by a commercial food company. In this scenario, a dis-
pute arises between public health authorities, one of the
victim’s families and the food company as to the limits
of ‘commercial-in-confidence’ and who controls access
to isolates (and any related information) previously sub-
mitted voluntarily by food producers to commercial food
laboratories for routine fee-for-service safety testing.
Panellists’ responses to this scenario focused on the
need to establish who was the legal owner of the isolates
held by the commercial food laboratory and whether pri-
vate companies have the right to block further testing
(WGS or otherwise) that lies outside the purpose for
which samples were submitted. New technologies such
as WGS were seen as being valuable to the investigation
of food-borne diseases. However, they also increase com-
mercial/reputational risk for companies who routinely
test their products, such that:
DP #22 “…mandated access [to commercial samples
and test results] may result in changes to testing in the
commercial domain (e.g. cessation of some testing)
such that isolates are no longer available… The
relationships between labs, food businesses and
primary industry and public health agencies are
important, as are the priorities of each entity.”
In round 2, panel members were split as to whether
WGS testing should proceed without the permission of
the food company (12 in favour, 10 against, 9 uncertain).
In their comments, many panellists were keen to empha-
sise that public interest should always trump commercial
interest, and questioned how a company could have ef-
fective property rights over a pathogen contaminating its
product. To explore this issue further, panellists were
asked, in round 3, to indicate the conditions under
which they believed it was appropriate to conduct a test
on an isolate collected from a commercial company
without prior consent.
Figure 4 indicates that significant disagreement
remained as to what conditions were required for testing
Fig. 4 Panellist’s preferences as to the conditions under which the possession of isolates collected from a commercial company should carry with
it the authority to conduct a test not agreed to at the time of collection (Round 3)
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to be appropriate. More detailed analysis of individual
responses revealed that these differences were also
present within disciplinary groups and across policy net-
works. Reflecting on their experiences, many, but not all,
panellists from the communicable disease policy net-
work wanted to establish a clear procedural separation;
they wanted to distinguish the need to be able to per-
form secondary tests on isolates submitted to commer-
cial food laboratories in order to inform epidemiological
investigations (finding out what is going on) from issues
of commercial-in-confidence and reputational damage
(managing commercial and property issues raised by the
public health response), whereas participants from both
networks with legal backgrounds wanted matters of
ownership and access to information to be resolved be-
fore any testing could take place. To provide remedies to
this situation (in the longer term) participants suggested
that legal clarity on the issue of public health access to
commercial data and environmental and food isolates
needed to be established.
Participant perceptions of the risks of technologically
enhanced communicable disease surveillance
The application of new technologies to communicable
disease surveillance can provide great benefits but also
create risks. In round 3, we asked participants to rank
the four most significant and four most likely risks for
individuals (11 items) and for the broader community (9
items) from lists compiled from previous survey rounds.
Final rankings were determined by assigning a score
equivalent to reverse rank (e.g. a score of 4 to items
rated 1st, 3 for items ranked 2nd, … 1 for items ranked
4th); scores were multiplied by the number of partici-
pants who gave each rank and the overall ranking was
determined by adding scores for each item. Add-
itional file 3: Tables S2 and S3 respectively show the final
rankings the panel gave to risks for individuals and risks
for the community.
For individuals, participants ranked the psychological
consequences of knowing one’s social media posts are
being monitored and the risk of breach in data security
highest, with these unwanted outcomes being seen as
both significant and likely (Additional file 3: Table S2).
Instances and potential social consequences of breaches
in the privacy of individuals from primary or secondary
data usages such as loss of privacy or stigma were not
seen as being major risks. In their comments, many
panellists noted that consent for data linkage and sec-
ondary use was implied, even as they shared concerns
that an erosion of community trust in health authorities
was the most significant risk from the systematic use of
these technologies (Additional file 3: Table S3). Notably,
the veracity of the data produced by enhanced surveil-
lance techniques was once again a key concern among
panel members, with the risk to the community of un-
necessary fear-mongering and resource misallocation
(through individuals changing their behaviour) being
ranked as significant and likely.
Discussion
Participants in this Delphi study, whom we assumed to
be representative of policy-makers and other stake-
holders involved in decision-making about new tech-
nologies for communicable disease research and
surveillance, shared a belief in their potential benefits.
However, our findings indicate that both groups were
uncertain about the public acceptability of routine col-
lection and linkage of such data to enhance surveillance.
Despite broad agreement that it could be ethically justi-
fied, participants were uneasy about creating a percep-
tion of threat to individual rights, which could erode
public trust. The panel identified the key challenge to
systematic use of new technologies as a need to establish
publicly supported guidelines for their operation.
There are good reasons for participants’ hesitation
about the use of these technologies, without a clear so-
cial licence. The socio-political impacts of technological
innovation and emerging risk uncertainty can quickly
undermine public trust in governments and, by implica-
tion, the authority and perceived legitimacy of associated
policy communities – as events surrounding the intro-
duction of mobile telephone masts and genetically modi-
fied crops attest [36, 37]. More broadly, political
sensitivities are easily heightened as new surveillance
systems are introduced – concerns about privacy, con-
sent and other individualistic values tend to dominate
public discourse [38]. In practice, however, when com-
pared to other state-led surveillance practices, typically
there has been little public opposition to use of personal
information by health authorities for the purposes of
protecting public health [8, 39]. In recent decades, for
the reasons described above, opposition to the use of
health specific surveillance data in new ways has been
more likely among public health officials than members
of the wider public [40–42]. Participants of this Delphi
were strongly in favour of enhancing communicable dis-
ease surveillance, with many supporting a need for
greater public interest consideration, not more privacy.
Where the panellists failed to agree was around appro-
priate thresholds for public health action and policy pro-
tections to be offered to subjects of enhanced
surveillance systems. For example, there was consistent
disagreement, across all three survey rounds, about the
relative importance of confidentiality and public health
risk and prioritisation of reasonable alternative interven-
tions; these differences need attention and resolution.
Experience shows that, with current analytical tools, in-
terpretation of passively collected and analysed online or
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pathogen WGS data raises questions about what counts
as significant or compelling evidence and what action, if
any, should follow [43]. The absence of a policy frame-
work to provide institutional support for new surveil-
lance systems and guide subsequent public health
actions comes at a cost [4]. Surveillance systems have
limited effectiveness unless they lead to an organised re-
sponse [44]. Although impossible to quantify, systematic
non-use of data can amplify and compound the harms
associated with inaction [22]. For reasons of transpar-
ency and public acceptability, if not protection, resolving
these issues should be a priority because not collecting
and using data of significance to public health can lead
to preventable harms [8, 45].
Against this background, the relevant Australian legis-
lation prioritises the pursuit of public goods, such as ef-
fective communicable disease surveillance, over
protecting private interests. Neither individuals nor
companies have a broad right to privacy under Austra-
lian law. Instead, the law in this area balances public
interest against protecting individual or commercial
privacy interests and includes a range of protections for
the public [46]. This extends to cyber law, which oper-
ates under a general principle that social media users
own the online content they create, but have limited
rights to control its secondary use by others (either indi-
viduals or organisations). Similarly, it is a
long-established principle under Australian common law
that there is no property in human biological samples.
This means a person does not own biological samples
taken from them (tissues or microbial isolates), nor does
the laboratory or facility that holds the samples. As long
as there is a clear public health (rather than research)
purpose for epidemiological investigation, it follows that
there are no significant legal barriers preventing labora-
tories from performing secondary tests on isolates with-
out the permission of the individuals from whom they
were collected [47].
In contrast, it would appear that food or environmen-
tal samples (including those collected from livestock) are
considered property under the law, such that the Public
Health and Food Acts do not clearly establish that fur-
ther testing of the isolate is legal without strong evi-
dence that the threat to public health is ongoing [48].
Most members of the panel were perplexed by this im-
pediment to secondary testing and argued that public in-
terests should always override any property claims. We
note that the case for such a pragmatic approach to is-
sues of consent and ownership for secondary testing of
isolates owned by commercial entities is bolstered by
epidemiological considerations. Some degree of strain
typing must be done routinely if this practice is to be
useful for identification of transmission events [5, 16].
Therefore, legal reform may be required because any
insistence on a high threshold of public health risk be-
fore pathogen WGS can be done would limit the timeli-
ness and, consequently, the effectiveness of this type of
communicable disease surveillance. The development of
clear guidelines for the secondary testing of patient, food
and environmental isolates should be a priority before
the use of WGS in epidemiological investigations be-
comes routine.
Finally, our study reveals a gap between existing policy
structures relevant to the use of WGS technologies and
social media monitoring for public health purposes, and
the individualistic focus of the concerns of most partici-
pants. As is the case with many activities undertaken in
pursuit of public health, some form of trade-off between
public and private interests is necessary. In order to
strike the right balance, it is important that the potential
benefits and harms of enhanced communicable disease
research and surveillance are weighed appropriately. The
content of interactions between participants from the
different policy networks sampled demonstrated a range
of attitudes as to how health authorities should collect,
link and use data. The panel concluded that privacy con-
cerns and potential conflicts with commercial interests
caused by enhanced surveillance techniques need to be
managed appropriately, but neither should substantively
limit the pursuit of public interests as important as ef-
fective communicable disease prevention and control.
However, efficient surveillance across a large population
is not achievable unless most people participate. A struc-
tured dialogue between interested groups and develop-
ment of an ethically and legally defensible rationale for
the design and operation of surveillance systems [49],
prior to their implementation, will help to reassure the
public and other stakeholders and enhance the likely
success of these systems.
Strengths and limitations
Delphi survey methods have several well-known limita-
tions, including that the substantive outcomes consist of a
set of group intuitions and perspectives, constructed
through highly structured social processes of justification
among experts [50]. However, as noted in the introduction,
the method is particularly useful for the evaluation of com-
plex problems where the rate of social or technological
change exceeds the rate of innovation in governance, where
evidence that can adequately explain or predict social ac-
tions is lacking, or both [25]. The initial response to partici-
pant invitations for the current survey was sufficient to
generate a lively debate, which was gratifying, given that
our invitation was unsolicited. Retention of participants
over successive rounds was moderate and the balance be-
tween members of different sectors remained constant.
Moreover, allowing participants to express their views and
comment on each other’s interpretation, via open-ended
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free text questions, over multiple survey rounds increased
the reliability of the study and improved the robustness of
the results.
This Delphi survey has captured the perspectives of rep-
resentatives of expert groups concerned with enhancing
communicable disease surveillance systems in Australia.
Because of differences in cultural norms and the surround-
ing social, legal and public health systems, a similar group
brought together in another jurisdiction may come to dif-
ferent conclusions. Perspectives of the Australian public are
currently being sought through a series of citizens’ juries, to
explore what they believe to be acceptable and legitimate
use of Big Data and pathogen WGS for the purposes of
communicable disease surveillance [51, 52].
Conclusion
The results of this Delphi survey suggest that there is broad
support for using event-based social media monitoring and
pathogen WGS technologies to enhance communicable dis-
ease surveillance systems across sectoral groups and relevant
policy networks. Panellists agreed there is a need to establish
a policy framework to ensure appropriate safeguards are in
place to protect privacy and that the public is consulted so
that they are not unnecessarily alarmed by, or suspicious of,
the introduction of new processes for data collection and
analyses. However, the emphasis of reforms should be on
enabling effective research and surveillance to be conducted,
where common benefits are possible. In this regard, the con-
cerns of Australian policy-makers and experts on this issue
are not unique. A recent WHO review points to the need to
engage with affected communities to establish the condi-
tions and protections under which it is acceptable for sur-
veillance to take place and develop institutional mechanisms
that ensure ethical issues are systematically addressed before
data collection, use and dissemination [45]. Given that these
technologies are already available and have the potential to
enhance the capacity of Australian and other health author-
ities to investigate and prevent outbreaks of infectious dis-
ease, with their attendant social and economic costs, the
development of clear ethical and legal guidance is urgently
needed. The absence of such policy and procedural protec-
tions means that public health authorities are likely to only
employ these new technologies sporadically, such that op-
portunities to protect individuals and the wider population
from harm will be missed.
Additional files
Additional file 1 The three hypothetical scenarios describing the use of
a new technology for the purposes of communicable disease surveillance
in (1) social media/online, (2) hospital/workplace, or (3) commercial
environments. (DOCX 10786 kb)
Additional file 2: Table S1. Participant characteristics. (DOCX 15 kb)
Additional file 3: Table S2. Risks to individuals from enhanced
communicable disease surveillance (Round 3). Table S3. Risks to the
community from enhanced communicable disease surveillance (Round
3). (DOCX 19 kb)
Abbreviations
WGS: whole genome sequencing
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge and thank Louisa McDonald Hall for her
contribution to the legal analysis and Angus Dawson for his comments and
suggestions during the drafting of the paper. We would also like to thank
our participants whose generosity, curiosity and insights have made this
research possible.
Funding
This work was supported by NHMRC Centre for Research Excellence
(#1102962). CD, GLG and JJ received funding support from a NHMRC Project
grant (#1083079). The funding organisations had no role in study design, the
collection or analysis of the data, data interpretation, writing, or the decision
to submit for publication.
Availability of data and materials
The authors declare that the data supporting the findings of this study are
available within the article (and its supplementary information files).
Authors’ contributions
CD designed and ran the study, led the collection, analysis and
interpretation of data, and the drafting of the paper. JJ and GLG designed
the study and made significant contributions to the analysis and
interpretation of data, and the drafting of this paper. All authors read and
approved the final manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate





The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Australian Centre for Health Engagement, Evidence and Values, School of
Health and Society, Faculty of Social Science, University of Wollongong,
Building 233.G05D, Wollongong, NSW 2500, Australia. 2Sydney Health Ethics,
Sydney School of Public Health, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia.
3Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology, Westmead Institute for
Medical Research, Westmead, NSW, Australia. 4Marie Bashir Institute for
Infectious Disease and Biosecurity, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW,
Australia.
Received: 7 May 2018 Accepted: 14 March 2019
References
1. World Bank. People, Pathogens, and Our Planet. Volume 1: Towards a One
Health Approach for Controlling Zoonotic Disease. Washington DC: The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 2010.
2. Degeling C, Johnson J, Kerridge I, Wilson A, Ward M, Stewart C, Gilbert G.
Implementing a One Health approach to emerging infectious disease:
reflections on the socio-political, ethical and legal dimensions. BMC Public
Health. 2015;15:1307.
3. Charles-Smith LE, Reynolds TL, Cameron MA, Conway M, Lau EH, Olsen JM,
Pavlin JA, Shigematsu M, Streichert LC, Suda KJ. Using social media for
Degeling et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2019) 17:35 Page 10 of 11
actionable disease surveillance and outbreak management: a systematic
literature review. PLoS One. 2015;10:e0139701.
4. Pavlin JA. Syndromic surveillance for infectious diseases. In: M’ikanatha NM,
Lynfield R, Van Beneden CA, de Valk H, editors. Infectious Disease
Surveillance. Hoboken: Wiley; 2013. p. 470–81.
5. Sintchenko V, Holmes EC. The role of pathogen genomics in assessing
disease transmission. BMJ. 2015;350:h1314.
6. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Expert Opinion on
Whole Genome Sequencing for Public Health Surveillance. Stockholm; 2016.
https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/expert-opinion-whole-genome-
sequencing-public-health-surveillance
7. Quainoo S, Coolen JPM, van Hijum S, Huynen MA, Melchers WJG, van
Schaik W, Wertheim HFL. Whole-genome sequencing of bacterial
pathogens: the future of nosocomial outbreak analysis. Clin Microbiol Rev.
2017;30:1015–63.
8. Gilbert G, Selgelid M. Electronic surveillance for communicable disease
prevention and control: health protection or a threat to privacy and
automony. In: Enemark C, Selgelid M, editors. Ethics and Security Aspects of
Infectious Disease Control. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd; 2012.
9. Salathe M, Bengtsson L, Bodnar TJ, Brewer DD, Brownstein JS, Buckee C,
Campbell EM, Cattuto C, Khandelwal S, Mabry PL. Digital epidemiology.
PLoS Comput Biol. 2012;8:e1002616.
10. Fung IC-H, Duke C, Cameron Finch K, Snook K, Tseng PL, Hernandez A,
Gambhir M, Fu K-W, Tse z. Ebola virus disease and social media: a
systematic review. Am J Infect Control. 2016;44:1660–71.
11. Tang L, Bie B, Park S-E, Zhi D. Social media and outbreaks of emerging
infectious diseases: a systematic review of literature. Am J Infect Control.
2018;46:962–72.
12. Guerrisi C, Turbelin C, Blanchon T, Hanslik T, Bonmarin I, Levy-Bruhl D, Perrotta
D, Paolotti D, Smallenburg R, Koppeschaar C, et al. Participatory syndromic
surveillance of influenza in Europe. J Infect Dis. 2016;214:S386–92.
13. Ginsberg J, Mohebbi MH, Patel RS, Brammer L, Smolinski MS, Brilliant L.
Detecting influenza epidemics using search engine query data. Nature.
2009;457:1012.
14. Chowell G, Cleaton JM, Viboud C. Elucidating transmission patterns from
Internet reports: Ebola and Middle East respiratory syndrome as case
studies. J Infect Dis. 2016;214:S421–6.
15. Collier NH. A Review of Web-based Epidemic Detection. In: The Politics of
Surveillance and Response to Disease Outbreaks: The New Frontier for
States and Non-state Actors. Chapter 6. London: Routledge; 2015. p. 85–105.
16. Besser JM. Use of molecular epidemiology in infectious disease surveillance.
In: M’ikanatha NM, Lynfield R, Van Beneden CA, de Valk H, editors. Infectious
Disease Surveillance. Hobeken: Wiley; 2013. p. 485–501.
17. Bansal S, Chowell G, Simonsen L, Vespignani A, Viboud C. Big data for
infectious disease surveillance and modeling. J Infect Dis. 2016;214:S375–9.
18. Davies SE, Youde J. The IHR (2005), disease surveillance, and the individual
in global health politics. Int J Hum Rights. 2012;17:133–51.
19. Ceyhan A. Surveillance as biopower. In: Ball K, Haggerty K, Lyon D, editors.
Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies. New York: Routledge; 2012. p. 38–45.
20. Rose N, Miller P. Political power beyond the State: problematics of
government. Br J Sociol. 2010;61:271–303.
21. Allen J, Holman C, Meslin E, Stanley F. Privacy protectionism and health
information: is there any redress for harms to health? J Law Med. 2013;21:
473–85.
22. Jones KH, Laurie G, Stevens L, Dobbs C, Ford DV, Lea N. The other side of
the coin: Harm due to the non-use of health-related data. Int J Med Inform.
2017;97:43–51.
23. Moran-Gilad J. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) for food-borne pathogen
surveillance and control – taking the pulse. Eurosurveillance. 2017;22:30547.
24. Purtle J, Field RI, Hipper T, Nash-Arott J, Chernak E, Buehler JW. The impact
of law on syndromic disease surveillance implementation. J Public Health
Manag Pract. 2018;24:9–17.
25. Landeta J. Current validity of the Delphi method in social sciences. Technol
Forecast Soc Chang. 2006;73:467–82.
26. Hill M, Varone F. The Public Policy Process. Abingdon-on-Thames:
Routledge; 2014.
27. Smith MJ. Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks
in Britain and the United States. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf; 1993.
28. Rhodes RAW. Policy network analysis. In: Moran M, Rein M, Goodin R,
editors. The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, vol. 3: Oxford University
Press; 2006. p. 425–47. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548453.003.
0020.
29. Colebatch H. Policy. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education, Open University
Press; 2009.
30. Veselý A. Policy advice as policy work: a conceptual framework for multi-
level analysis. Policy Sci. 2017;50:139–54.
31. Jones J, Hunter D. Consensus methods for medical and health services
research. BMJ. 1995;311:376.
32. Ziglio E. The Delphi method and its contribution to decision-making. In:
Adler M, Ziglio E, editors. Gazing Into the Oracle: The Delphi Method and Its
Application to Social Policy and Public Health. London: Jessica Kingsley
Publishers; 1996. p. 3–33.
33. Gale NK, Heath G, Cameron E, Rashid S, Redwood S. Using the framework
method for the analysis of qualitative data in multi-disciplinary health
research. BMC Med Res Methodol. 2013;13:117.
34. Ritchie J, Spencer L. Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research. In:
Burgess RG, Bryman A, editors. Analyzing Qualitative Data. London: New
York: Routledge; 1994. p. xii. 232.
35. Keeney S, Hasson F, McKenna HP. A critical review of the Delphi technique
as a research methodology for nursing. Int J Nurs Stud. 2001;38:195–200.
36. Toke D, Marsh D. Policy networks and the GM crops issue: assessing the
utility of a dialectical model of policy networks. Public Adm. 2003;81:229–51.
37. David JH, Jonathan SC. Wireless smart meters and public acceptance: The
environment, limited choices, and precautionary politics. Public Underst Sci.
2012;23:688–702.
38. Barnard-Wills D. Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity and the
State. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd; 2012.
39. Fairchild AL, Bayer R, Colgrove J, Wolfe D. Searching Eyes: Privacy, the State,
and Disease Surveillance in America. Berkeley: University of California Press;
2007.
40. Fairchild AL, Bayer R. HIV surveillance, public health, and clinical
medicine—Will the walls come tumbling down? N Engl J Med. 2011;365:
685–7.
41. Diamond CC, Mostashari F, Shirky C. Collecting and sharing data for
population health: a new paradigm. Health Aff. 2009;28:454–66.
42. Stoto MA, Dempsey JX, Baer A, Cassa C, Gibson PJ, Buehler JW. Expert
meeting on privacy, confidentiality, and other legal and ethical issues in
syndromic surveillance. Adv Dis Surveill. 2009;7:2.
43. Busch L. Looking in the wrong (La)place? The promise and perils of
becoming big data. Sci Technol Hum Values. 2016;42(4):657–78.
44. Uscher-Pines L, Farrell CL, Babin SM, Cattani J, Gaydos CA, Hsieh Y-H, Moskal
MD, Rothman RE. Framework for the development of response protocols
for public health syndromic surveillance systems: case studies of 8 US states.
Disaster Med Public Health Prep. 2009;3:S29–36.
45. Fairchild AL, Haghdoost AA, Bayer R, Selgelid MJ, Dawson A, Saxena A, Reis
A. Ethics of public health surveillance: new guidelines. Lancet Public Health.
2017;2:e348–9.
46. Doyle C, Bagaric M. Privacy Law in Australia. Alexandria: Federation Press; 2005.
47. Skene L, Savulescu J, Delatycki M. Genetic testing of stored tissue from a
deceased person to define a relative’s disease risk: Legal and ethical
viewpoints. J Law Med. 2015;22:864–70.
48. Food Act: Sections 37, 38 and 68. New South Wales: Government of NSW;
2003.
49. Mawudeku A, AbdelMalik P, Lemay R, Boily L. GPHIN Phase 3: One Mandate,
Multiple Stakeholders. In: The Politics of Surveillance and Response to
Disease Outbreaks: The New Frontier for States and Non-state Actors.
Chapter 5. London: Routledge; 2015. p. 71.
50. Sackman H. Delphi Critique; Expert Opinion, Forecasting, and Group
Process. Lanham: Lexington Books; 1974.
51. Degeling C, Rychetnik L, Street J, Thomas R, Carter SM. Influencing health
policy through public deliberation: Lessons learned from two decades of
Citizens’/community juries. Soc Sci Med. 2017;179:166–71.
52. Street J, Duszynski K, Krawczyk S, Braunack-Mayer A. The use of citizens’
juries in health policy decision-making: a systematic review. Soc Sci Med.
2014;109:1–9.
Degeling et al. Health Research Policy and Systems           (2019) 17:35 Page 11 of 11
